College of William & Mary Law School

William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository
Faculty Publications

Faculty and Deans

1997

The Interactive Constitution: An Essay on Clothing
Emperors and Searching for Constitutional Truth
Neal Devins
William & Mary Law School, nedevi@wm.edu

Repository Citation
Devins, Neal, "The Interactive Constitution: An Essay on Clothing Emperors and Searching for Constitutional Truth" (1997). Faculty
Publications. 442.
https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/facpubs/442

Copyright c 1997 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository.
https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/facpubs

BOOK REVIEW
The Interactive Constitution: An Essay on Clothing
Emperors and Searching for Constitutional Truth
REMNANTS OF BELIEF. By Louis Michael Seidman and Mark V. Tushnet. (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1996) Pp. vii, 218. $35.00.
REVIEWED BY NEAL DEVINS*
INTRODUCfiON
Did the New Deal kill constitutional discourse? Michael Seidman and Mark
Tushnet think so, and their book, Remnants of Belief, 1 is an attempt to explain
why and to suggest ways that this New Deal devil can be exorcised from
constitutional argument.
Seidman and Tushnet's tract is at once pessimistic and romantic. Boldly
proclaiming that the New Deal revolution made it "apparent to everyone" that
all constitutional arguments can and will be "manipulated to advance the
particular policy goal of the advocate who makes them, " 2 Remnants contends
that constitutional discourse does not matter because it fails to persuade.
Seidman and Tushnet then, have written a book that taps into the "cynical
disengagement that is said to mark the 'X Generation.' " 3
Remnants, however, also waxes poetic about the "glory days" of New Deal
and Great Society liberalism4 as well as its judicial embodiment-the Warren
Court-which "restored the good name of active judicial review." 5 Along these
lines, Seidman and Tushnet, who came of age in the 1960s,6 embrace reform
proposals that "satisfy liberal nostalgia for the lost youth of constitutional
argument." 7 Specifically, they trumpet the "promise" of narrative jurisprudence
and implore lawyers to "maintain sympathy and understanding for the positions
they oppose. " 8 By calling upon constitutional advocates to "maintain[ ] a sense

* Professor of Law, Lecturer in Government, College of William and Mary. Thanks to Mark Graber,
Mike Klarman, Tom Krattenmaker, Alan Meese, Bob Nagel, and Cynthia Ward for commenting on an
earlier draft of this review. All errors are my own.
I. L. MICHAEL SEIDMAN & MARK V. TuSHNET, REMNANTS OF BELIEF ( 1996).
2. /d. at 90.
3. /d. at 194.
4. /d. at 176.
5. /d. at 43.
6. Seidman was born in 1947, graduated from law school in 1971, and clerked for Justice Thurgood
Marshall in 1972. Tushnet was born in 1945, graduated from law school in 1971, and also clerked for
Justice Marshall in 1972.
7. SEIDMAN & TusHNET, supra note I, at 191.
8. /d. at 195-96.
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of political community" with their opponents,9 Seidman and Tushnet hope that
intrinsically politicized constitutional discourse may be conducted with a more
explicit, honest focus on public policy tradeoffs.
In this book review, I argue that Remnants is provocative, important, and
unconvincing. While Seidman and Tushnet expertly demonstrate the limits of
modem constitutional argument, they either ignore or undervalue the virtues of
the current system. In particular, by making legal academics and Supreme Court
Justices the focus of their analysis and recommendations, Seidman and Tushnet
never take stock of the vital role that nonjudicial actors play in shaping
constitutional values. The constitutionalization of political discourse, instead, is
discounted as the trivialization of constitutional analysis. This assessment misses
the mark. Constitutional dialogues both among elected officials and between the
courts and elected government are inevitable and, at least sometimes, healthy.
On abortion, school desegregation, and other deeply divisive topics, these
exchanges have made the Constitution more relevant and enduring. As such,
rather than erect a wall separating crass political discourse from intellectually
rigorous constitutional analysis, there is reason to recognize that some good can
come from the political practice of "reflexively transform[ing] policy controversies into constitutional problems." 10
Before serving up a celebration of the status quo, I will examine Seidman and
Tushnet's proof of the failings of post-New Deal constitutional analysis, highlighting some of their book's ample teachings, but also casting doubt on its central
claim that constitutional discourse is at once flawed and vital. Specifically,
Seidman and Tushnet never explain why, if all constitutional discourse is
ultimately political, legal elites should engage in "constitutionalized" public
policy analysis. By not examining what gives the Constitution independent
force and why legal elites should perform quintessentially political cost-benefit
analysis, Remnants provides no foundation for its reform proposals. Furthermore, by ignoring nonjudicial political actors, Seidman and Tushnet imply that
it should be legal elites alone who conduct this policy-driven constitutional
discourse.
In this way, Remnants appears as value-laden as the theories of constitutional
interpretation it criticizes. Indeed, by calling attention to the myriad ways in
which Seidman and Tushnet embrace activist, progressive judicial review, I
suggest that a skeptical reader can spin the book's generalist critique of postNew Deal constitutional argument into a condemnation of the conservative
handiwork of the Burger and Rehnquist Courts. This is unfortunate; Seidman
and Tushnet's commitment to making constitutional discourse more honest,
civil, and believable is commendable and almost certainly sincere. Furthermore,
had Seidman and Tushnet forthrightly incorporated nonjudicial actors into their
analysis, their call for activist judicial review would appear more sensible and
9. /d. at 196.
10. /d. at 3.
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more principled. Differences in the ways that courts and political actors reward
and punish interest groups necessitate that all branches and levels of government participate in the shaping of public policy.
I. THE DECLINE AND FALL OF CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS

On March 29, 1937, America's constitutional landscape was changed forever.
A series of Supreme Court decisions upholding state and federal efforts to
combat the Depression lowered structural and substantive barriers to New Deal
reforms. 11 This constitutional revolution eviscerated the Lochner era, 12 a period
from 1905 to 1937 during which the Court infused laissez-faire economics into
its constitutional analysis in order to strike down roughly two hundred social
and economic laws. Universally condemned as a symbol of unprincipled judicial overreaching, the Lochner era helped prompt populist, political, and academic attacks against the Court. 13 Although FOR's Court-packing plan is the
best known of these attacks, the most devastating attack came from legal realist
academics.
Claiming that the baseline principles underlying judicial decisionmaking
were both arbitrary and susceptible to manipulation, legal realists suggested that
courts are fundamentally political organs, putting into place the normative
values that judges find desirable. In particular, legal realists of the 1920s and
1930s savaged the Lochner Court's free market philosophy "with a degree of
insight, brilliance, and social passion that has never been equaled since." 14
Emphasizing that the market was a social rather than a natural construct, legal
realism provided New Dealers with an intellectual framework that justified
government intrusions into the Depression-plagued marketplace. 15
Legal realism did more than justify the repudiation of the Lochner Court,
however. For proponents of the administrative state, the legal realist attack
explained why expert administrators were better suited than judges "to promote
justice or efficiency in economic regulation." 16 For Seidman and Tushnet, this
New Deal innovation revealed a larger truth about the judicial role-that
constitutional interpretation is inescapably value-laden and, as such, constitutional analysis will always be driven by "a particular set of policy preferences

II. The structural barriers were federalism and the nondelegation doctrine, and the substantive
barrier was liberty to contract. See, e.g., West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937);
Sonzinsky v. United States, 300 U.S. 506 (1937); Virginian Ry. v. System Fed'n No. 40, 300 U.S. 515
(1937); Wright v. Vinton Branch of Mountain Trust Bank, 300 U.S. 440 (1937).
I2. See Lochner v. New York, I98 U.S. 45 (1905).
13. See generally HOWARD GILLMAN, THE CONSTITUTION BESIEGED (1993); MORTON J. HOROWITZ,
THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870-I960: THE CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY (I992);
WILLIAM E. LEUCHTENBURG, THE SUPREME COURT REBORN (1995).
14. HOROWITZ, supra note 13, at 195.
I5. See id. at I94-98; SEIDMAN & TuSHNET, supra note I, at 32-33. See generally ROBERT J.
GLENNON, THE ICONOCLAST AS REFORMER (I985).
I6. HOROWITZ, supra note I3, at 2I5. See generally JAMES M. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS
(1938).
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that cannot be distinguished from the preferences expressed in other political
forums." 17
The New Deal revolution, according to this account, was directly at odds
with "the great hope of constitutional law," which was to provide a "common
language" that would allow for the discussion of contested political issues "on
a higher level of generality." 18 By "destroy[ing]" the "predicates" of constitutional argument, "the possibility of genteel discussion within an elite that
agreed on a common set of premises" 19 was forever lost. As a result, at least for
Seidman and Tushnet, the line separating constitutional from base political
discourse has been eviscerated, and constitutional argument has become another
form of "the language of American politics. " 20
Remnants does not mince words here. It details what Seidman and Tushnet
consider to be the horrifying fallout from this New Deal revolution. The quality
of constitutional argument, we are told, "has been very poor indeed." 21 Rather
than recognize that constitutional questions are "hard," commentators "persistent[ly]" treat them as if they were "easy" and characterize those who disagree
as "foolish, or evil, or dangerous. " 22 As a result, although "Americans are
preoccupied with constitutional argument, . . . very few people are actually
persuaded by the tendentiousness . . . [that] has become a hallmark of our
constitutional debate. " 23
Seidman and Tushnet's attack on sound bite constitutional analysis extends
well beyond the usual suspects of politicians, policy wonks, and newspaper
columnists. They also find legal academics and judges guilty of oversimplified,
single-minded, and sometimes self-contradictory constitutional analysis. Indeed, the focus of Seidman and Tushnet's analysis is the failure of legal elites to
engage in nuanced, evenhanded constitutional discourse.
To illustrate the sorry state of contemporary constitutional discourse, Seidman
and Tushnet highlight similar failings in the constitutional arguments of both
"liberal[s]" 24 and "[r]ight-wing[ers]." 25 For example, conservative Robert Bork
and progressive Laurence Tribe share the disagreeable "habit of demonizing .
[their] opponents and presenting [their] own views as if they were the only
conclusions a fair-minded person could reach. " 26 Worse still, Bork and Tribe
conceal their biases "ineptly and transparently," adjusting their constitutional
17. SEIDMAN & TuSHNET, supra note I, at 42.
18. /d. at 166.
19. /d. at vii, 165.
20. /d. at 3.
21. /d. at 4.
22. /d. at 4-5.
23. /d. at vii, 9.
24. /d. at 12.
25 . /d. at 18.
26. /d. at 13. In addition to the Bork-Tribe pairing, Seidman and Tushnet also pair newspaper
columnists George Will (from the right) and Nat Hentoff (from the left), as well as an article written by
conservative academic Michael McConnell with an article written by liberal academics Cass Sunstein
and David Strauss. /d. at 5-9, 15-20.
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theories to reach their desired outcomes. 27 For Seidman and Tushnet, this
failing underscores why constitutional discourse is unpersuasive and thus,
irrelevant. Specifically, rather than "assume direct responsibility" for heartfelt
personal beliefs, 28 constitutional advocates pretend to engage in principled
academic discourse while wearing their biases on their sleeves. Combusting
with this hypocrisy, constitutional advocates, by refusing to appreciate their
opponents' counterarguments, "rarely reach out to the uncommitted and virtually never throw new or interesting light on [a particular constitutional] problem. " 29 This practice, according to Seidman and Tushnet, is pervasive, extending
to "virtually all modem constitutional advocacy, including [their] own. " 30
Seidman and Tushnet's mea culpa sets the stage for their extended analysis of
Supreme Court decisionmaking over a range of controversial issues, including
racial equality, pornography, the death penalty, and the state action requirement.
This often compelling analysis repeatedly and, most often, convincingly demonstrates that constitutional questions are hard and that attempts to simplify them
are unpersuasive. Moreover, Remnants makes a second claim that anchors much
of the book's attack against post-New Deal constitutional analysis. By showing
that Supreme Court Justices often use constitutional theory to support desired
policy outcomes, 31 Seidman and Tushnet contend that constitutional theory is
not about some generalized search for constitutional truth, but instead, operates
as a funnel, eliminating from consideration alternative realities. 32 In this way,
constitutional theory has the effect of making constitutional argument oversimplified and one-sided: "Instead of a technique for settling disputes by resort to
reason," constitutional theory is a mechanism "of asserting power over others"
and, consequently, "will not succeed in bridging disagreement over the things
we care about the most." 33
Witness DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services? 4
Holding that local governmental authorities do not have an affirmative duty to
prevent child abuse, the Supreme Court refused to hold Winnebago County

27. /d. at 21. Bork's desire to put the Framers' intent into effect, according to Seidman and Tushnet,
varies from issue to issue. When it comes to the death penalty, "judges ought not to apply their own
evolving morality"; on questions of gender equality, however, Bork recognizes that it is appropriate for
constitutional doctrine to evolve when "society has changed." /d. at 10-12 (quoting Robert Bork). Tribe
commits a similar error. His due process and equal protection jurisprudence, as revealed in his attacks
on Bork's judicial philosophy, "are at war with each other." /d. at 14. In particular, while Tribe
embraces judicial discretion when it comes to abortion and other privacy rights, he condemns Bork's
embrace of a "reasonable basis" test to evaluate classifications involving women and the poor because
judges should not have "discretion in enforcing equal protection rights." /d. at 15.
28. ld. at 20.
29. /d. at 21.
30. ld. at 24-25.
31. Seidman and Tushnet make this point by contrasting inconsistencies in the decisionmaking of
Justices Scalia and Brennan on speech and property rights cases decided in 1987. See id. at 75-76.
32. ld. at 20-21.
33. /d. at 189.
34. 489 u.s. 189 (1989).
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responsible for the gross negligence of one of its social service workers. 35 For
Seidman and Tushnet, DeShaney is a hard case. On the one hand, social workers
now know that they are shielded from liability when they do not do their jobs
and, consequently, are less likely to play an affirmative pro-active role. 36 On the
other hand, had the Court found the county liable, social workers would have
incentive to intervene "where it is unwarranted as well as where it is appropriate. " 37 Furthermore, to finance more frequent intervention, taxes would have to
be increased or competing social service programs would have to be scaled
back. 38
The DeShaney decision, as Seidman and Tushnet insightfully explain, does
not reveal these competing social policy concerns. Chief Justice William Rehnquist cloaks his majority opinion with a supposedly neutral action-inaction
distinction-a distinction that, for Seidman and Tushnet, finds support neither in
constitutional history nor in Supreme Court decisionmaking. 39 This opprobrium
is not limited to the majority opinion; Seidman and Tushnet savage Justice
Harry Blackmun's emotional dissent for its failure to consider the question that
supposedly animates it, namely, whether "[d]oing justice" supports the state or
"poor Joshua." 40 By not considering which outcome "will make social workers
more careful in the future and prevent more such tragedies," 41 Seidman and
Tushnet find Blackmun's analysis a simplistic knee-jerk reaction to a difficult
social policy issue. 42
DeShaney underscores the failure of both conservatives and progressives to
seriously examine the policy outcomes of the decisions they render, and is thus,
for Seidman and Tushnet, emblematic of the failings of contemporary constitutional argument. 43 To "escape from this cycle, " 44 they propose that we replace
the search for constitutional truth with an open-ended dialogue of competing
values. For them, one mechanism that "holds some promise for reconstructing
constitutional discourse" is to "explore storytelling as a means of improving

35 . See id. at 196-97. As a result, Joshua DeShaney, severely beaten and permanently disabled by his
abusive father, could not challenge the county's repeated and knowing failure to intercede in a clearly
abusive relationship.
36. SEIDMAN & TusHNET, supra note I, at 54.
37. /d. at 59.
38. /d.
39. /d. at 52-55.
40. /d. at 58.
41. /d.
42. Tushnet earlier described Justice Blackmun's dissent as reflecting "nothing other than compassion, no awareness that Joshua's case stands for a broader set of circumstances that will inevitably be
regulated by the rule the Court adopts." Mark Tushnet, The Degradation of Constitutional Discourse,
81 GEO. L.J. 251, 302 (1992) (footnotes omitted).
43. Six of the book's nine chapters are case study illustrations of the complexity of constitutional
controversies. Each of these illustrations succeeds in demonstrating that competing normative visions
and indeterminate evidence cloud the resolution of constitutional disputes.
44. SEIDMAN & TuSHNET, supra note I, at 189.
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our understanding of law. " 45 Recognizing, however, that narrative jurisprudence might be "just as tendentious" as existing styles of argument, 46 Seidman
and Tushnet ultimately seek shelter in Anthony Kronman's The Lost Lawyer,47 a
book that claims there is a nexus between the quality of public decisionmaking
and an advocate's ability "to maintain sympathy and understanding for the
positions they oppose. " 48
In advancing this argument, Seidman and Tushnet do not seriously consider
the possibility that there is a right approach to solving constitutional problems.
Pointing to the sophistry of constitutional advocates and the difficulties posed
by constitutional questions, they assume that the political triumph of legal
realism was deserved. For Seidman and Tushnet, this means that constitutionalists must develop "a kind of dual consciousness" -not forgetting "their hardwon knowledge of the emptiness of constitutional arguments" while "somehow
authentically" acting as if constitutional arguments "were not empty. " 49
II.

THE CONSTITUTION IS DEAD! LONG LIVE CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION!

Remnants, while portraying itself as a reformist manifesto, cannot free itself
from the shackles of its doom and gloom assessment of the failure of contemporary constitutional discourse. Describing their proposal as a plea for a "kind of
maturity, self-knowledge, and tolerance for contradiction that no society in
history has been able to muster," 50 Seidman and Tushnet recognize that their
attempt to resuscitate constitutional interpretation will almost certainly fail.
Why then write this book? Seidman and Tushnet contend that Remnants is a
last gasp attempt to bring together competing factions in today's constitutional
interpretation wars, 51 presumably so that all sides can admit that their work is
biased and incomplete. By admitting to weaknesses in their own work and by
45. ld. at 195.
46. /d. at 201. For a more detailed treatment of the limits of narrative jurisprudence, see generally
Daniel A. Farber & Suzanna Sherry, Telling Stories out of School: An Essay on Legal Narrative, 45
STAN. L. REv. 807 (1993); Tushnet, supra note 42. For responses to these articles, see generally William
N. Eskridge, Jr., Gaylegal Narratives, 46 STAN. L. REv. 607 (1994); Gary Peller, The Discourse of
Constitutional Degradation, 81 GEO. L.J. 313 (1992).
47 . ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE LoST LAWYER: FAILING IDEALS OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION (1993).
48. SEIDMAN & TUSHNET, supra note I, at 196. Like Seidman and Tushnet, Kronman finds fault with
the triumph of winner-take-all advocacy over truth-seeking. See KRONMAN, supra note 47, at 133
(maintaining that lawyers must deliberate with their clients "about the wisdom of their clients' ends").
For a provocative critique of Kronman's book and a more optimistic assessment of the possible moral
virtues of contemporary law practice, see generally David B. Wilkins, Practical Wisdom for Practicing
Lawyers: Separating Ideals from Ideology in Legal Ethics, 108 HARV. L. REV. 458 (1994).
49. SEIDMAN & TUSHNET, supra note I, at 201. Tushnet has previously repudiated grand theories of
constitutional decisionmaking, and in so doing, disavowed the relevance of the Constitution as well as
judicial review. MARK V. T'USHNET, RED, WHITE, AND BLUE (1988); see also Michael J. Gerhardt,
Critical Legal Studies and Constitutional Law, 67 TEx. L. REv. 393, 403 (1988) ("Tushnet maintains
that the republican tradition requires neither constitutional theory nor a constitution.").
50. SEIDMAN & T'USHNET, supra note I , at 201.
51. /d. at 198-99.
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underscoring the complexity of constitutional controversies, Seidman and Tushnet profess hope that constitutionalists of all stripes will consider the sound
arguments of their opponents so that their own arguments can be more honest,
forthright, nuanced, and accepting.
Remnants, however, may be as much an example of the ills of values-based
constitutional discourse as it is an antidote to the disease Seidman and Tushnet
describe. In particular, Remnants never explains why, if constitutional interpretation is inherently political, legal elites should engage in "constitutional" costbenefit public policy analysis. 5 2 Moreover, Seidman and Tushnet's claims about
the political triumph of legal realism, and with it the New Deal origins of
politicized one-sided constitutional interpretation, are problematic. Although
legal realist scholarship may have fundamentally affected the content of legal
academic discourse, politicized constitutional debate dates back to the nation's
founding. For example, several significant pre-New Deal political challenges to
Supreme Court decisionmaking make clear that both judges and elected officials
have always understood that politics plays a role in shaping constitutional
decisionmaking. By speaking of the legal realist origins of politicized constitutional interpretation, Seidman and Tushnet implicitly discount the relevance of
these pre-New Deal challenges. 5 3 As a result, Remnants seems more like a book
about legal elite interpretation than a book dedicated to the larger enterprise of
improving the quality of constitutional interpretation. 54
Correspondingly, by focusing their sights on legal elite discourse, Seidman
and Tushnet never let on to what role, if any, elected officials should play in
shaping constitutional values. Consequently, although they may well believe
that pre-New Deal constitutional argument was politicized, and although they
never express disapproval of joint political-judicial resolutions of disputed
policy questions, Remnants nevertheless elevates-perhaps unintentionallylegal elite constitutional discourse. At the very least, by isolating legal elite
discourse, Seidman and Tushnet suggest that legal academics and judges are
better positioned than politicians to follow their call for "dual consciousness. " 55
As such, their description of the problem Remnants is intended to address is far
too narrow. Legal elite constitutional interpretation, while certainly important, is
but a part of the broader enterprise of constitutional decisionmaking.

52. Specifically, Seidman and Tushnet call for constitutionalists to examine the policy outcomes of
the decisions they render, to take seriously the arguments of individuals whose values they disagree
with, and to engage in an open-ended dialogue of competing values. An example of this type of
cost-benefit analysis is Remnants's insightful critique of DeShaney. See supra notes 34-42 and
accompanying text.
53. See infra notes 56-66 and accompanying text.
54. Seidman and Tushnet make clear that their concern relates to academic discourse by describing
"[t]he New Deal revolution [as] destroy[ing] forever the possibility of genteel discussion within an elite
that agreed on a common set of premises." SEIDMAN & TusHNEf, supra note I, at 165.
55. Id. at 201. Remnants thereby suggests that "constitutionalized" policy solutions crafted by legal
elites (or, at least, legal elites who practice "skeptical tolerance and an ironic self-awareness") are
superior to solutions crafted by politicians. /d.
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A. THE LAW-POLITICS NEXUS

The politicization of constitutional decisionmaking dates back to the nation's
founding. John Marshall, by placing politics ahead of the search for constitutional truth, has been dubbed "the great Nietzschean judge of our tradition. " 56
For example, Marshall advanced his Federalist Party agenda for a strong
national government through Marbury v. Madison, 57 McCulloch v. Maryland, 58
and other landmark rulings. This fact was not lost on Marshall's political
opponents, including Thomas Jefferson and Andrew Jackson, who denounced
these decisions. 59 More importantly, Jefferson and Jackson were willing to act
on this disagreement. Jefferson, outraged that Federalist judges failed to strike
down the Alien and Sedition Acts, 60 pardoned all individuals convicted under
the statute;61 Jackson, claiming that he was not bound to follow McCulloch,
vetoed as unconstitutional a bill that sought to recharter the Bank of the United
States. 62
This intermingling of law and politics, of course, is not limited to Marshall,
Jefferson, and Jackson. Immediately before the Court's ruling in Dred Scott, 63
Justices Catron and Grier, "contrary to [their] usual practice," wrote Presidentelect James Buchanan of their intent to invalidate the Missouri Compromise and
thereby "settle a controversy which has so long and seriously agitated this
country. " 64 Following the Civil War, despite the efforts of late-nineteenthcentury classical legal thinkers to "create an autonomous legal culture," 65
President Ulysses Grant used his appointments power to promote Republican
Party policies; this included obtaining the Court's approval of legislation that
treated paper money as legal terider for the purpose of discharging prior debts.
Although the Court had just invalidated the statute, Grant engineered a five-tofour reversal of the earlier decision by appointing two Republican Justices to
join the three already on the Court.66
56. Sanford Levinson, Law as Literature, 60 TEx. L. REv. 373, 389 ( 1982).
57 . 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803).
58. 17 U.S . (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
59. Jefferson condemned "the impropriety of [the Court's] gratuitous interference" in Marbury. 15
THE WRmNGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 447 (Albert Bergh ed., 1907). For descriptions of the politics
surrounding Marshall's landmark rulings in Marbury and McCulloch, see LoUis FISHER & NEAL
DEVINS, POLITICAL DYNAMICS OF CONSTITlJTIONAL LAW 25-44 (2d ed. 1996). For a discussion of the
circumstances surrounding Jackson's veto, see id. at 18.
60. Sedition Act of 1798, I Stat. 596 (prohibiting activities and writings opposing federal government measures).
61 . Jefferson believed "the law to be a nullity, as absolute and palpable as if Congress had ordered
us to fall down and worship a golden image." I THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 59, at

43 .
62. A COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 581-87 (James D. Richardson
ed., 1896).
63 . Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
64. 10 THE WORKS OF JAMES BUCHANAN 106-08 (James B. Moore ed., 1910). Prior to this correspondence, Catron wrote Buchanan urging him to pressure Grier to sign the opinion. /d. at 106 n.l.
65 . See HoROWITZ, supra note 13, at 9-31 (describing structure of classical legal thought).
66. Hepburn v. Griswold, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 603 (1870), overruled by Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S.
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The prevalence and visibility of these constitutional conflicts-all of which
occurred during this nation's first century-suggest that legal realism's principal
achievement was its repudiation of Lochner's free market philosophy, not the
destruction of the ideal that law and politics can and should be separated.
Although classical legal thought dominated judicial rhetoric from the end of the
Civil War until the turn of the century, 67 persistent constitutional dialogues
between courts and elected officials have always stood as a vivid reminder of
the nexus between law and politics.
Along these lines, the advent of legal realist scholarship had very little to do
with Franklin Delano Roosevelt's attempt to dethrone the Lochner Court. For
example, notwithstanding the power of legal realist attacks against the conception of a self-executing market economy, the Roosevelt administration's efforts
to pressure the Court were silenced by adverse public reaction to FOR's 1935
denouncement of the Court's "horse and buggy definition of interstate commerce."68 Two years later, emboldened by his landslide 1936 victory, Roosevelt
launched his ill-fated proposal to pack the Court with Justices sympathetic to
the New Deal agenda. Given his belief that the only way to affect Supreme
Court decisionmaking was through purely political means, 69 Roosevelt undoubtedly saw the Supreme Court as a political institution. Unlike the legal realists,
however, the question of whether law was inherently political did not matter to
Roosevelt. Rather, believing that the only way to advance his reformist agenda
was to bring down the Lochner Court, Roosevelt set out to accomplish that task
through brute force, not academic critique.
Roosevelt ultimately placed his imprimatur on the Court. From 1937 to 1940,
he appointed five close associates to the Court. 70 The Roosevelt Revolution,
(12 Wall.) 457, 553 (1871). But see Charles Fairman, Mr. Justice Bradley's Appointment to the Supreme
Court and the Legal Tender Cases, 54 HARV. L. REv. 1128, 1142 (1941) (questioning whether Justice
Bradley promised Grant that he would vote in favor of legislation that treated paper money as legal
tender).
67. Starting with Oliver Wendell Holmes's "The Path of the Law" address in 1897, O.W. Holmes,
Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REv. 457 (1897), claims within the legal profession that judges
found, rather than made, the law gave way to the progressive belief that law cannot be separated from
politics and social reality. See HOROWITZ, supra note 13, at 142, 193-212; see also SEIDMAN & TuSHNET,
supra note I, at 32-35. In 1908, for example, Louis Brandeis introduced sociological studies to support
maximum hours legislation to protect working women from the physiological and psychological effects
of long hours. Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412,419 (1908).
68. Michael Nelson, The President and the Court: Reinterpreting the Court-Packing Episode of
1937, 103 PoL Sci. Q. 267, 276-78 (1988) (detailing public opinion polls and press coverage of FDR's
attacks on Lochner Court decisionmaking).
69. See Neal Devins, Government Lawyers and the New Deal, 96 COLUM. L. REv. 237, 250-56
· (1996) (describing President Roosevelt's Court-packing plan in review of LEUCHTENBURG, supra note
13).
70. Roosevelt appointed Hugo Black in 1937; Stanley Reed and Felix Frankfurter in 1938; and
William 0. Douglas and Frank Murphy in 1939. See fiSHER & DEVINS, supra note 59, at 79.
Roosevelt's landslide victory in 1936 also convinced Justice Owen Roberts to uphold some New Deal
reforms. In Roberts's own words: "Looking back, it is difficult to see how the Court could have resisted
the popular urge for uniform standards throughout the country-for what in effect was a unified
economy." OWEN J. ROBERTS, JR., THE COURT AND THE CONSTITUTION 61 (1951).
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however, did not fundamentally change the ways _in which the Supreme Court
and the elected branches of government interact with each other. Attempts to
change the direction of legal doctrine through judicial appointments, for example, were well established before Roosevelt. 71 Indeed, Congress's repudiation of Court-packing specifically embraced the use of appointments as an
"orderly" way to transform the judiciary. 72 Consequently, by calling attention
to the political nature of constitutional interpretation, the New Deal reinforced
that which had come before it. 73
This is not to say that the New Deal did not alter constitutional discourse. In
particular, the New Deal signalled the rise of the administrative state and, with
it, the increasing importance of constitutional interpretation to American life.
From the end of the Civil War until 1929, the nation's economic substructure
was radically transformed by the Industrial Revolution. 74 By 1932, with the
Great Depression firmly under way, Roosevelt promised to reinvigorate government and "meet the urgent needs of a twentieth-century community." 75 The
ensuing fight between FOR and the Lochner Court both made constitutional
interpretation more visible and increased awareness of the Court's vulnerability
to political attack. Moreover, once FOR prevailed, the importance of constitutional interpretation was not lost on a nation now subject to increasing regulation by a rapidly growing administrative bureaucracy. Furthermore, with Courtpacking and other Roosevelt initiatives confirming the law-politics nexus,
constitutional interpretation became a more pervasive part of American political
life. 76
B. THE EMPTINESS OF (LEGAL ELITE) CONSTITUTIONAL DISCOURSE

The New Deal changed our conception of government and, in so doing,
further politicized constitutional decisionmaking. Thus, there is force to Seidman
and Tushnet's claims about the New Deal altering the face of constitutional
71. See generally HENRY J. ABRAHAM, JUSTICES AND PRESIDENTS: A POLITICAL HISTORY OF APPOINTMENTS TO THE SUPREME COURT (2d ed. 1985).
72. See FISHER & DEVINS, supra note 59, at 85.
73. Legal realism proved useful here; it offered a scathing criticism of values-based Lochner Court
decisionmaking thereby putting into focus what had come before-that politics and ideology figure
prominently in constitutional decisionmaking. As such, classical legal thought could not be reconciled
with the New Deal revolution.
74. See Lawrence Lessig, Understanding Changed Readings: Fidelity and Theory, 47 STAN. L. REv.
395, 454 ( 1995) (noting that during this period "the total value of manufactured products increased
nearly twenty times; railroad track mileage went from under 40,000 miles nationwide to over 260,000;
[and] the urban population increased from 16.1 percent to 49.1 percent").
75. ROBERT H. JACKSON, THE STRUGGLE FOR JUDICIAL SUPREMACY 175 (1941). See generally
WILLIAM E. LEUCHTENBERG, FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT AND THE NEW DEAL, 1932-1940 (1963); Cass R.
Sunstein, Constitutionalism After the New Deal, 101 HARV. L. REv. 421 ( 1987).
76. See generally LEUCHTENBURG,' supra note 13. Unlike legal realist claims, however, this realpolitik approach to constitutional interpretation does not deny the possibility that there is a correct way to
interpret the Constitution. Rather, by emphasizing the ways in which the elected branches of government shape constitutional doctrine, the possible correctness of an interpretation seems somewhat
irrelevant.
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interpretation. Nevertheless, by making no mention of constitutional controversies that preceded the New Deal, their claims about legal realism's triumph and
the ensuing decline of constitutional discourse seem overblown. 77 Furthermore,
by not considering the pivotal role that social and political forces play in
constitutional discourse-thereby making judges and legal academics the exclusive focus of their analysis-Seidman and Tushnet's reform proposals are too
narrowly focused. With that said, their presentation fits their recommendations:
by targeting legal elites and treating legal realism's triumph as a fait accompli,
Seidman and Tushnet quite rightly advocate that judicial opinions and legal
scholarship be more open about underlying values and more far-ranging in
assessing competing policy considerations.
As it turns out, this style of decisionmaking replicates the type of cost-benefit
analysis associated with public policy analysis. For Seidman and Tushnet, of
course, the inevitable politicization of constitutional discourse explains why
constitutional interpretation should replicate public policy analysis. This assertion, however, begs a fundamental question: Why have constitutional analysis at
all? Remnants is silent on this question. Although imploring constitutionalists to
act as if "[constitutional] arguments were not empty ... all the while knowing
on a different level of consciousness that [they] ... most assuredly [are]," 78
Seidman and Tushnet never ~xplain why we should engage in this charade.
Why not simply say that everything is political and the Constitution-or, at
least, constitutional interpretation-is a nullity? Much in Remnants supports
this conclusion. In particular, the kind of dual consciousness that Seidman and
Tushnet propose is almost certainly unworkable; once you commit to constitutional argumentation to achieve your political preferences, you are going to
forget to give an appreciative hearing to the other side. Seidman and Tushnet
recognize this, lamenting "that no society in history" has been able to engage in
the type of "skeptical commitment" that they embrace. 79 Nevertheless, after
"argu[ing] that constitutional argument in the modem context divides rather
than unites," 80 and that this pattern is likely to persist, 81 Seidman and Tushnet
proclaim that "[for] all its deficiencies, constitutional argument would not have
played such a prominent role in American public debate for so many years if it
were not serving important purposes." 82 Moreover, they assert that "a world

77. This is not to say that legal realist scholarship did not affect academic discourse. It did. Rather
than focus on the categorization of legal doctrine through treatises, post-New Deal academic discourse
critically evaluated the normative presumptions underlying such doctrine. See HOROWITZ, supra note
13, at 247-68 (discussing post-World War II legal thought).
78. SEIDMAN & TuSHNET, supra note I, at 200.
79. !d. at 201. In calling for "skeptical commitment," Seidman and Tushnet hope that constitutionalists will link "an ironic self-awareness of the contingency of one's own beliefs" with a recognition that
"constitutional rhetoric provides the only vocabulary we have for reaching beyond ourselves." /d. at
200, 201.
80. /d. at 194.
81. Id. at 201.
82. /d. at 193.
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without constitutional rhetoric" would be dominated by "narrow interest groups"
that care more about "raw power" than "the public good." 83
Seidman and Tushnet never defend these sweeping claims. Instead, they take
for granted that "raw power" matters more to the popularly-elected leviathan
than it does to values-driven legal elites. 84 Accordingly, Seidman and Tushnet
do not blink when they suggest that thorough cost-benefit analysis is best
accomplished by elites with life tenure-judges and academics-rather than by
politicians beholden to "narrow interest groups." Under this approach, moreover, there is no need to consider claims that courts should not make social
policy because the adjudicative process is ill-adapted to ascertain social facts or
because adjudication makes no provision for policy review. 85
Remnants's condemnation of interest group politics and political argument
explains Seidman and Tushnet's belief that legal elites should matter and that
constitutional interpretation legitimates their participation in shaping public
policy. It also explains the book's nearly exclusive focus on Supreme Court
decisions and legal academic analysis. When Seidman and Tushnet talk about
the general culture, their real concern seems- to be that comer of the world
dominated by judges and legal academics. In this way, Remnants is as valuesbased and incomplete as the process-based theories it criticizes. Seidman and
Tushnet fence out political discourse, including nonjudicial constitutional interpretation, because they believe that leg.al elites are more capable of considering
both sides of an issue than politicians or other governmental actors.
Seidman and Tushnet's distaste for political decisionmaking begs the question as to what types of policy decisions would be made by legal elites who
wistfully pursue the superhuman task of skeptical commitment. Aside from
suggesting that legal elites are shielded from the interest group pressures that
doom politicians, Seidman and Tushnet make no attempt to assess the policy
ramifications of their call for dual consciousness. Their explanation for this is
that their sole concern relates to improving the quality of constitutional discourse, not to advancing a particular political agenda. Along these lines, and to
Seidman and Tushnet's credit, Remnants goes to great lengths to suggest that
progressives and conservatives are equally guilty of making simplistic, misleading, and unpersuasive constitutional arguments. They pair conservative judges
and scholars with liberal judges and scholars. They demonstrate the difficulties
associated with constitutional interpretation by highlighting weaknesses in both
83. /d. at 193-94.
84. There is something very strange about this argument. After relentlessly trashing judges and legal
academics for engaging in biased and incomplete analysis, Seidman and Tushnet hail legal elites as the
best available bulwark for liberty and deliberative process.
85. See, e.g., DONALD L. HOROWITZ, THE COURTS AND SOCIAL POLICY (1977); R. SHEP MELNICK,
REGULATION AND THE COURTS: THE CASE OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT (1983); JEREMY RABKIN, JUDICIAL
COMPULSIONS: How PUBLIC LAW DISTORTS PuBLIC POLICY (1989). Seidman and Tushnet's condemnation of interest-group politics, however, does not extend to claims that courts are as susceptible as
elected officials to interest group capture. See, e.g., RABKIN, supra, at 147-81 (revealing capture of
district and appeals courts in the District of Columbia by civil rights interests).
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liberal and conservative arguments. They explain that, because their book is
about the style of constitutional argument, "[they] will spare the reader [their]
own efforts to manipulate constitutional argument." 86 These herculean efforts, it
would seem, are intended to convince the reader that Remnants, in fact, is about
improving constitutional interpretation by underscoring a shared failing of all
constitutional advocates.
Theoretically, at least, Remnants's process-oriented approach is neither liberal nor conservative. For example, although Seidman and Tushnet are leftleaning, their call for dual consciousness could produce conservative results. 87
Consider the potential for narrative-based jurisprudence: Environmentalists will
put themselves in the position of hardy rural property owners; feminists will
imagine the (short) life of a fetus; and card-carrying members of the American
Civil Liberties Union will think about the victim before they suggest that the
criminal must go free because the constable has blundered. 88
What is theoretically possible and what is likely to occur, however, are two
quite different things. When Seidman and Tushnet finished working on Remnants in May 1995, 89 the Republican takeover of Congress was in full swing.
Moreover, with two Supreme Court appointments under his belt, President Bill
Clinton demonstrated that he "was unwilling to undertake even moderate risk"
to select a nominee willing "to depart from conventional wisdom." 90 As such,
the political process offered little hope of "radical[izing]" a Supreme Court
dominated by moderate and conservative Republican appointees. 91 In contrast
to the Republican Congress, legal elites, especially the legal academics who are
Remnants's principal audience, are politically left of center. 92 Not surprisingly,
legal elite-dominated policy analysis will almost certainly be to the left of
elected government preferences. 93 For example, it is hard to imagine legal elite
86. SEIDMAN & TuSHNET, supra note 1, at 25.
87. For this very reason, Suzanna Sherry criticized Mark Tushnet's "unremitting attack on judicial
review" in Red, White, and Blue, supra note 49. Suzanna Sherry, Outlaw Blues, 87 MICH. L. REV. 1418,
1437 (1989). For Sherry, "[l]t is dangerously utopian to assume that if one destroys the status quo it
will be replaced by the political agenda of the left rather than of the right." /d.
88. Thanks to Alan Meese for these examples.
89. SEIDMAN & TUSHNET, supra note 1, at viii.
90. /d. at 192.
91. /d.
92. The representation of demographic groups at the top 100 law schools reveals that law professors
are far more liberal than the general population. For example, although 46.2% of the full-time working
population are Democrats, 80.4% of law faculty are Democrats. James Lindgren, Measuring Diversity,
Speech to the National Association of Scholars (Jan. 5, 1997) (transcript on file with The Georgetown
Law Journal). More striking, although 14.9% of full-time working women are Republicans, 0.5% of
women law faculty are Republicans. /d.; see also Earl M. Maltz, The Coun, the Academy, and the
Constitution: A Comment on Bowers v. Hardwick and Its Critics, 1989 B.Y.U . L. REv. 59 (reviewing
academic writings on privacy questions and concluding that academic commentary on constitutional
law reveals a "general commitment to left-center political values").
93. At other times, however, political discourse may yield more progressive outcomes than Courtdominated discourse. See infra note 110. Nonetheless, legal academic discourse almost always yields
left-center outcomes. See Maltz, supra note 92, at 92. Furthermore, during the heyday of the Warren
Court, when Seidman and Tushnet came of age, legal elite discourse was more "radical" than political
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discourse resulting in a massive overhaul of welfare, the repudiation of same
sex marriage, the denial of antidiscrimination protections to gays and lesbians,
the reenactment of abortion funding restrictions, or the elimination of certain
affirmative action programs. 94
Along these lines, a skeptical reading of Remnants suggests that Seidman and
Tushnet's personal commitment to compassionate, progressive, activist jurisprudence influences both their explication of why constitutional questions are hard
and their analysis of Supreme Court decisionmaking. 95 Most striking, in demonstrating the complexity of constitutional issues, Remnants implicitly calls into
question the correctness of decisions almost certainly at odds with Seidman and
Tushnet's personal preferences. No progressive Warren Court decision is put
under its microscope. The focal point, instead, is the conservative decisionmaking of the Burger and Rehnquist Courts. In addition to DeShaney, Remnants
examines the Court's approval of the death penalty,96 its rejection of impact-based
proofs of discrimination, 97 and its resurrection of federalism-based limits on congressional authority. 98 While these analyses highlight both the strengths and weaknesses
of conservative and progressive positions, Seidman and Tushnet invest substantially
more effort in proving that conservative arguments do not take into account progresdiscourse. SEIDMAN & TuSHNET, supra note I, at 192. For this reason, Seidman and Tushnet's embrace
of legal elite discourse may reflect a "liberal nostalgia for the[ir]lost youth." /d. at 191. See infra note
II 0 and accompanying text.
94. A recent Association of American Law Schools (AALS) newsletter is emblematic of legal
educators' left-leaning tendencies. Spread out over 16 pages of the March 1996 AALS newsletter were
two articles concerning minority hiring and retention at law schools; an article on the experiences of
women in legal education; an announcement of an AALS workshop on gay and lesbian legal issues; an
essay by AALS President Wallace Loh calling for a "commitment to broadening the boundaries of
inclusiveness of our profession, especially at a time when that commitment is under assault nationwide"; and, most significant, an AALS Executive Committee statement embracing race- and genderbased affirmative action. See THE NEWSLETTER (Ass'n of Am. Law Sch., Wash., D.C.), Mar. 1996, at I,
5, 6, 7, 9, 16.
95. Seidman and Tushnet's approval of progressive, activist decisionmaking is clear. They applaud
the Warren Court for its "idealism and moral drama," SEIDMAN & TuSHNET, supra note I, at 190, attack
President Clinton for not "desir[ing] a return to Warren Coun activism," id. at 190, and condemn New
Deal judges for failing to "chang[e) the distribution of social and economic power." /d. at 135.
Correspondingly, they lament the fact that New Dealers "(i]ronically ... put in place a conservative
judicial ideology because at the time it seemed the best way to open up the space for promising
possibilities of liberal legislative action." /d. at 138. The New Deal Supreme Court, for example, was
far less"likely to strike down state and federal laws than the Lochner Court before it or the Warren Court
after it. See Lawrence Lessig, Translating Federalism: United States v. Lopez, 1995 SuP. CT. REv. 125,
167 n.l31 (charting patterns in Supreme Court's invalidation of state and federal law).
96. SEIDMAN & TusHNET, supra note I, at 140-65.
97./d.at99-116.
98. /d. at 182-89. This inventory is representative but incomplete. Seidman and Tushnet make brief
mention of several other Supreme Court decisions. They also consider, in greater detail, the Supreme
Court's conditional offer doctrine as well as its resistance to government efforts to regulate pornography
and to set limits on the financing of political campaigns./d. at 72-90, 117-39. These analyses, however,
confirm Seidman and Tushnet's penchant for dissecting that with which they disagree. For example,
their chapter on pornography and the financing of political campaigns emphasizes the sensibility of
government regulation to protect women and candidates who do not appeal to the political mainstream.
/d. atll7-39.
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sive counterarguments than in revealing similar limits of progressive arguments.99 Furthermore, they speak approvingly of progressives committed to
"social justice" 100 and critically of "polemical," 101 "right wing scholars." 102
Seidman and Tushnet err in their choice of targets. By focusing their analysis
on that with which they disagree and by lauding their friends while mocking
their enemies, Seidman and Tushnet make it too easy for conservatives to
dismiss their work as yet another leftist attack on the Rehnquist Court. 103
Without question, a cynic can easily conclude that Seidman and Tushnet's real
interest is to encourage a return to the Warren-era judicial activism they
applaud. This is unfortunate, for Remnants is an important b~ok. It highlights
the complexity of social policy issues that animate constitutional interpretation.
It offers lucid and often devastating criticism of Court doctrine and academic
writings. In so doing, it convincingly argues that constitutional interpretation is
often incomplete, if not a smoke screen for some political agenda. Furthermore,
its recommendation that advocates open themselves up to competing positions
seems heartfelt and desirable. For these reasons, it is important to consider
Remnants's central claim that the politicization of constitutional advocacy has
made the Constitution irrelevant. The remainder of this review considers and
ultimately rejects this claim, arguing instead that there is something healthy as
well as inevitable about the current state of affairs.
III. Two

CHEERS FOR THE STATUS

Quo

Ten years ago, then United States Attorney General Edwin Meese sparked
controversy by arguing that the executive and legislative branches have a duty
99. For example, weaknesses in the policy arguments advanced by death penalty proponents receive
at least twice as much attention as Seidman and Tushnet's dissection of abolitionist policy arguments.
!d. at 147-52. Even more revealing, Seidman and Tushnet lambast the Court's rejection of disparate
impact proofs in Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976), condemning the decision as "fundamentally incompatible" with "one of the most famous and celebrated decisions in constitutional lawBrown v. Board of Education," 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (Brown/). SEIDMAN & TusHNET, supra note I, at
104-05. Contrary to this characterization, I have argued elsewhere that Brown and Davis are compatible. See Neal Devins, The Rhetoric of Equality, 44 VAND. L. REv. 15 (1991). Nevertheless, despite
their unbalanced treatment of conservative and progressive positions, I found much of Seidman and
Tushnet's critique persuasive.
100. SEIDMAN & TusHNET, supra note 1, at 12.
101. /d.
102. /d. at 18. In particular, Laurence Tribe is celebrated for devoting his "not inconsiderable energy
and ingenuity to ... further the cause of social justice," while Robert Bork is dissed for "producing
polemical writings seemingly designed to curry favor with his conservative patrons." !d. at 12.
Moreover, Remnants pays far more attention to progressive scholarship than it does to conservative
scholarship. Sources cited in the book's bibliographic essay tend to advance progressive values. For
example, with only one or two exceptions, sources cited in the chapter on race-"limited to a few of
the most influential works" -embrace progressive values./d. at 210.
103. Seidman and Tushnet are their own worst enemies. After telling us that most constitutional
interpreters, including themselves, shield their policy preferences behind ostensibly neutral constitutional analysis, they invite a skeptical reading of their book. To establish credibility, Seidman and
Tushnet should bend over backwards to call attention to the failings of leftist academics and judges,
rather than highlight their admiration of their compatriots.
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to interpret the Constitution and, consequently, Supreme Court decisions are not
forever "binding on all ... parts of government." 104 Although castigated as a
"jurisprudential stink bomb" by the New Republic's Michael Kinsley 105 and
condemned for "invit[ing] anarchy" by the New York Times's Anthony Lewis, 106
the Meese speech triggered renewed interest in the study of how courts and
political actors communicate with each other. Over the past decade, political
scientists and legal academics have written a spate of books and articles
assessing the quality of constitutional interpretation by elected government and
the consequences of interchanges with the judiciary. 107 Even Clinton Supreme
Court appointee Ruth Bader Ginsburg has entered this fray, emphasizing the
importance of three-branch constitutional dialogues and arguing that judges "do
not alone shape legal doctrine." 108
For Seidman and Tushnet, however, this topic holds little interest. Perceiving
that the politicization of constitutional interpretation has been its downfall, they
appear to have written off political actors altogether. 109 Although never committing to one view or another on the appropriate role of the political branches in
constitutional dispute resolution, Remnants nowhere suggests that its lessons of
openness and honesty are relevant to political actors. 110 Moreover, by assuming

I 04. Edwin Meese Ill, The Law of the Constitution, 61 TuL. L. REv. 979, 986 ( 1987).
105. Michael Kinsley, Meese 's Stink Bomb, WASH. PosT, Oct. 29, 1986, at Al9.
106. Anthony Lewis, LAw of Power?, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 27, 1986, at A23.
107. See generally LOUIS FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL DIALOGUES: INTERPRETATION AS POLITICAL PRoCESS (1988); JUDGES AND LEGISLATORS (Robert A. Katzmann ed., 1988); GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE
HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? (1991); Symposium, Elected Branch
Influences in Constitutional Decisionmaking, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1993, at I .
108. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Speaking in a Judicial Voice , 67 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1185, 1198 (1992).
109. For example, although recognizing that "[c]onstitutional rhetoric is the language of American
politics," SEIDMAN & TusHNET, supra note I, at 3, and that "we are stuck with a system in which
constitutional argument will continue to play a central role in political debate," id. at 4, they never
consider what politicians have done or should do. Their effort "to focus on the quality of [constitutional] argument," id., examines only the opinions of judges and the writings of legal academics. Along
these lines, they are disappointed that legal academics, like politicians, make partisan, closed-minded
arguments in their academic writings and elsewhere. /d. at 9, 15. Yet, by focusing on the work of
academics with close ties to the world of politics, Seidman and Tushnet make politicized academic
writings seem more prevalent than they in fact are. For example, all five legal academics highlighted in
their introductory chapter-Robert Bork, Michael McConnell, David Strauss, Cass Sunstein, and
Laurence Tribe-have close ties to political interests. Bork served as, among other things, Solicitor
General and Acting Attorney General for Presidents Nixon and Ford. McConnell, a Reagan administration political appointee, represents religious conservatives both in court and before Congress. Strauss
ran much of the Senate Judiciary Committee's Supreme Court confirmation hearing for David Souter
and helped draft the President's Supreme Court brief in the Paula Jones lawsuit. Sunstein worked with
the Clinton transition team in 1992 and has testified before Congress on several occasions. And Tribe
represents progressive interests in court and before Congress.
110. In fact, Seidman and Tushnet's decision to make legal academic discourse the focus of their
analysis and recommendations suggests just the opposite. Interestingly, Seidman and Tushnet do not
consider the possibility, advanced by many left-leaning academics, that the progressive agenda is best
served through political actors, not courts. See, e.g., RoSENBERG, supra note 108, at 342-43; ROBIN
WEST, PROGRESSIVE CONSTITUTIONALISM 290-318 (1994); Michael J. Klarman, Rethinking the Civil
Rights and Civil Libenies Revolutions, 82 VA. L. REv. I, 7-18 (1996). This choice of emphasis may
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the worst about the sound bite adversarial quality of politics, Seidman and
Tushnet never examine the possible virtues of the politicization of constitutional
discourse, which is certainly more relevant and may be more enduring than
legal elite constitutional discourse.
Without question, constitutional interpretation by the elected branches makes
constitutional discourse more relevant. Through television, newspapers, and
other media outlets, the public is made aware of constitutional controversies
through elected government action, including the efforts of interest groups to
pressure political actors. In fact, Americans are far more aware of elected
government action that has constitutional ramifications than they are of Supreme Court decisionmaking. Media coverage plays a large role here; because
Court decisions are episodic, media attention to Court action pales in comparison to the coverage given to the ongoing political and cultural battles over
abortion, affirmative action, school prayer, and other divisive issues. 111
Seidman and Tushnet do not deny that the constitutionalization of American
politics profoundly affects public awareness of, and interest in, constitutional
interpretation. 112 In many respects, this is their principal complaint about
contemporary constitutional discourse-that it is rhetorically divisive, inconsistent, and closed-minded, precisely because it is too much like politics. 113 At the
same time, their model of activist, compassionate judicial review will only
exacerbate the politicization of constitutional discourse. Politicians seeking
reelection are drawn to those constitutional issues that affect the lives of their
well be generational. Seidman and Tushnet are part of a "generation of commentators [who were] born
late enough to ... build upon the New Deal's egalitarianism." Martin Shapiro, Fathers and Sons: The
Court, the Commentators, and the Search for Values, in THE BURGER COURT: THE COUNTERREVOLUTION
THAT WASN'T 218, 237 (Vincent Blasi ed., 1983). More precisely, they came of age "at the very time
the New Deal's welfarism had faltered in the legislative and executive arenas" while, thanks to the
Warren Court, "it had moved forward persistently in the judicial arena." /d. at 220. As a result,
Seidman and Tushnet simultaneously embrace the New Deal's commitment to social justice and
disavow its repudiation of activist judicial review. SEIDMAN & TuSHNET, supra note I, at 135. For
identical reasons, as Martin Shapiro aptly observes, Seidman and Tushnet are part of a generation that
"can love the Warren Court ... [but] cannot love the Burger Court ... because the Burger Court is
responsive to, and a victim of, the breakdown of the New Deal consensus." Shapiro, supra, at 237
(emphasis omitted). Accordingly, Seidman and Tushnet's Court-centered approach may well be rooted
in their need "to satisfy liberal nostalgia" for times gone but not forgotten. SEIDMAN & TuSHNET, supra
note I , at 191.
Ill. See Charles H. Franklin & Liane C. Kosaki, Media, Knowledge, and Public Evaluations of the
Supreme Court, in CONTEMPLATING COURTS 356-57, 370 (Lee Epstein ed., 1995).
112. Remnants, moreover, does not dispute that political action influences constitutional decisionmaking. In fact, Tushnet has suggested that a nexus may well exist between the 1994 Republican takeover
of Congress and the Supreme Court's increasing recognition of federalism-based limits on congressional action. See Mark Tushnet, Living in a Constitutional Moment?: Lopez and Constitutional
Theory, 46 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 846 ( 1996).
113. Seidman and Tushnet have reason to see the language of politics as directly contradictory to
their proposal for honest, broadly focused constitutional analysis. Politicians are partisan. Their public
pronouncements are one-sided, not soul-searching. They manipulate doctrine, theory, and facts to
support their positions. Their fact-finding hearings are filled with witnesses who will say what the
politicians want to hear. Indeed, they will only invoke the Constitution when it suits their purposes,
typically to bring down proposals they dislike.
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constituents. 114 Activist judicial review undoubtedly will increase the impact of
constitutional interpretation and, with it, political interest in constitutional
decisionmaking. Witness, for example, FDR's political campaign against the wchner Court, Richard Nixon's attack against progressive Warren Court decisions, and
Ronald Reagan's pledge to appoint judges "who share our commitment to
judicial restraint." 115
Politics, however, is not simply the price paid for activist judicial review.
Politics also informs legal elites about what matters to the American public. For
committed legal realists like Seidman and Tushnet, an understanding of what
animates social and political forces should be critical. For this reason, legal
elites should not be shielded from the hurly-burly of politics. Instead, to ensure
"that Jaw serves the community's purposes, and that these purposes are the
prerogative of common citizenship and not the preserve of academic expertise," 116 the words and deeds of legal elites are proper) y subject to the tugs and
pulls of politics.
Take the case of Lani Guinier, whose nomination to head the Justice Department's Civil Rights Division was pulled in the midst of a political firestorrn
about her academic writings. Seidman and Tushnet, who admire Guinier's
"fairminded and qualified" arguments, lament her rough treatment in "the
world of sound bites and op-ed articles." 117 No doubt, Guinier was shabbily
treated, especially by her Democratic sponsors. But, in important respects,
Guinier's rough treatment was salutary. It informed legal academics, interest
groups, and others about the political saliency of Guinier's writings (or, at least,
the saliency of the ideas attributed to Guinier). In effect, social and political
forces have made Guinier's writings more textured and more revealing. 118
The politicization of constitutional discourse informs constitutional interpretation in other important ways. Hydraulic pressures within the political system
may well make the Constitution more enduring as well as more relevant. In
particular, constitutional dialogues between the courts and elected government
often result in more vibrant and durable constitutional interpretation. Abortion
and school desegregation are two prime examples of this phenomenon. In both
instances, courts and elected officials influenced each other, resulting in a constitutional standard that successfully (if not perfectly) balances competing interests.
114. See generally DAVID R. MAYHEW, CONGRESS: THE ELECfORAL CONNECfiON (1974) (arguing that
re-election is principal motivation driving behavior of members of Congress).
115. Text of 1984 Republican Party Platform, reprinted in 40 CONG. Q. ALMANAC, vol. XL, 41-8,
55-B (1984).
116. Robert Post, Lani Guinier; Joseph Biden, and the Vocation of Legal Scholarship, 11 CONST.
COMMENTARY 185, 193 (1994).
117. SEIDMAN & TuSHNET, supra note I, at 15.
118. In the case of Guinier, this is particularly important. Her controversial writings were about
ways to enhance the political power of the minority community. As a result, political reaction to her
writings is instructive in evaluating her claims about political power. Another example of political
discourse improving the thinking of legal elites is the conflagration over Robert Bork's Supreme Court
nomination. See ROBERT F. NAGEL, JUDICIAL POWER AND AMERICAN CHARACTER: CENSORING OURSELVES
IN AN ANXIOUS AGE 27-43 (1994 ).
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The saga of abortion rights underscores the interactive nature of constitutional decisionmaking. Roe v. Wade 119 served as a critical trigger to the judicial
recognition of abortion rights, overcoming politically potent pro-life interests
that have always stood in the way of populist abortion reform. 120 Roe also
prompted the elected branches of government into action. From 1973 to 1989,
306 abortion-restricting measures were passed by forty-eight states. 121 In 1992,
after decades of elected government resistance as well as the appointment of
new Supreme Court Justices, the Court responded to these pressures and
returned much of the decisionmaking power relating to this divisive issue back
to the states. Repudiating Roe's stringent trimester test in favor of a more
deferential "undue burden" standard, Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 122 while
reaffirming "the central holding of Roe," signalled the Court's increased willingness to uphold state regulation of abortion. 123
Casey, however, did not trigger an antiabortion revolution. According to Alan
Guttmacher Institute studies, "antiabortion legislators [have] heeded [Casey]
... and curtailed their attempts to make abortion illegal." 124 In 1994, for
example, no legislation was introduced to outlaw abortion. Furthermore, in the
two years following Casey, one-third of abortion-related legislative initiatives would
have guaranteed the right to abortion. Finally, of the handful of abortionrestricting regulations adopted since Casey, all involve restrictions approved by
the Court-waiting periods, informed consent, and parental notification.
Casey appears to have stabilized, if not resolved, the abortion dispute. While
the Supreme Court eviscerated Roe's trimester standard, the post-Casey calm
reveals that Roe shaped elected government attitudes. Contrary to the pre-Roe
period, during which forty-six states either prohibited or severely limited abortion access, 125 abortion rights are now a secure feature of our con-stitutional
landscape.
Without question, to a pro-choice advocate, Casey's balance sells out important interests of women, and, to a pro-lifer, it permits moral outrages to
continue. But there is no realistic alternative to Casey's balancing act. The
political upheaval that followed Roe reveals the unworkability of a strident
pro-choice jurisprudence. But a jurisprudence allowing the prohibition of abor119. 410 u.s. 113 (1973).
120. See DAVID J. GARROW, LIBERTY AND SEXUALITY 359, 374 {1993) (explaining that when Roe was
decided pro-choice activists had abandoned efforts to seek legislative repeal of criminal abortion
statutes). For a competing, but in my opinion incorrect, perspective, see Ginsburg, supra note 109, at
1208 (suggesting that early 1970s legislative reform efforts had set the stage for more far-reaching
legislative reforms).
121. See Glen Halva-Neubauer, Abortion Policy in the Post-Webster Age, 20 Pusuus 27, 43 (1990).
122. 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (plurality opinion).
123. /d. at 878 (plurality opinion).
124. STATE REPROD. HEALTH MONITOR (Alan Guttmacher lnst., New York, N.Y.), May 1994, at ii.
125. There is good reason to think that politically potent pro-life interests, at least at the time of Roe,
would have successfully blocked the efforts of pro-choice advocates to repeal or modify abortion
restrictions in state legislatures. See Neal Devins, The CountenTUljoritarian Paradox, 93 MICH. L. REv.
1433, 1445-48 (1995).
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tions is equally unworkable. In the years before Roe, when nontherapeutic
abortions were prohibited in nearly every state, abortions were almost as
common as they are today. 126 Ultimately, abortion is too divisive for either
pro-choice or pro-life absolutism to rule the day. Absent the constitutional
dialogue that followed Roe, however, the politically unworkable trimester standard would have remained in place.
Supreme Court efforts to end racial segregation in education likewise exemplify the reaches and limits of the judiciary's ability to transform society. On the
one hand, Brown v. Board of Education 127 proved critical to the eradication of
dual school systems in southern states. In particular, Brown can be linked to a
series of 1960s legislative and regulatory initiatives. 128 The 1964 Civil Rights
Act, for example, authorized Justice Department participation in school desegregation litigation and demanded that federal grant recipients, such as school
systems, operate in a nondiscriminatory manner. 129
On the other hand, beginning with Brown, the Supreme Court allowed its
perception of elected government preferences to shape its decisionmaking in
this area. In an effort to temper southern hostility to its decision, the Court did
not issue a remedy in the first Brown decision. One year later, while declaring
that desegregation must proceed with "all deliberate speed," 130 the Court
recognized that "varied local school problems" were best solved by "[s]chool
authorities" and that delays associated with "problems related to administration" were to be expected. 131 By taking into account potential resistance to its
decision, the Court in Brown engaged in the type of interest-balancing that has
set political parameters on judicial intervention in equal educational opportunity.
Noting that "some achievable remedial effectiveness may be sacrificed because of
other social interests" and that "a limited remedy" may be chosen "when a more
effective one is too costly to other interests," 132 the Court recognized that the rights of
victims of discrimination must be balanced against a broad spectrum of competing
policy concerns. Specifically, aside from victims' rights, the Court in Brown valued
local control of public school systems and judicial restraint. 133

126. See RosENBERG, supra note I 08, at 178-80. For critiques of this claim, see Peter H. Schuck,
Public Law Litigation and Social Reform, 102 YALE L.J. 1763, 1777-80 (1993) (suggesting that
abortion rates could have declined if Roe had been decided the other way); Neal Devins, Judicial
Matters, SO CAL. L. REv. 1027, 1057-58 (1992) (arguing that Roe prompted the opening of abortion
clinics throughout the country, making abortion safer and more readily available).
1276. 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (Brown l).
128. See Devins, supra note 126, at 1039-46.
129. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 28 and 42 U.S.C.). For further discussion of the role that elected government played in
advancing the Brown mandate, see FISHER & DEVINS, supra note 59, at 242-56.
130. Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955) (Brown II).
131. /d.at299-300.
132. Paul Gewirtz, Remedies and Resistance, 92 YALE L.J. 585, 599 (1983).
133. For this reason, I disagree with Seidman and Tushnet's conclusion that "Brown implies that the
government has an affirmative obligation to take whatever measures are required to end the subjugation
of African-Americans as a group." SEIDMAN & TusHNET, supra note I, at 107.
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Social and political forces, especially federal government efforts to enforce
Brown during the 1960s, also figured prominently in the Supreme Court's
approval of mandatory busing remedies in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg
Board of Education. 134 Swann, however, went well beyond elected government
preferences. During the Nixon and Reagan administrations, the Court and the
elected branches of government fought a pitched battle over busing, a battle that
has now abated. In 1991 and again in 1992, the Supreme Court, as it did with
abortion, recognized greater state and local control over public schools 135 and
limited a controversial hard-line position rather than disavowing it. Thus, an
equilibrium of sorts has been achieved. Specifically, by empowering district
court judges to take local circumstances into account in deciding whether a
school system has satisfied its desegregation obligations, 136 the Rehnquist Court
has emphasized concerns for local control and judicial restraint at the expense
of victims' rights. At the same time, these rulings neither require nor encourage
district court judges to terminate school desegregation injunctions. Consequently, although rejecting district court efforts to include suburban school
systems in a Kansas City, Missouri desegregation order, 137 the Court did not
interfere with intrusive district court orders requiring state-subsidized housing
construction in Yonkers, New York 138 and imposing a statewide tax levy to
support desegregation in Kansas City. 139
Attaining an equilibrium with regard to school desegregation and abortion
required all branches and all levels of government to do battle with one another.
This dynamic process yielded a very nuanced, very delicate (if not very
deliberate) compromise. That this interactive process may too closely resemble
the making of sausage helps to explain Barbara Craig and David O'Brien's
characterization of the abortion dispute as an "illustrative ... [and] disappointing reflection" of the American system. 140 Nevertheless, as Justice Ginsburg
rightly observed at her confirmation hearing, our system is one in which courts
"do not guard constitutional rights alone. Courts share that profound responsibility with Congress, the [P]resident, the states, and the people." 141
That courts sometimes initiate these constitutional dialogues is indisputable.
For that reason, although judicially created "rights talk" sometimes stands as a
134. 402 U.S. I (1970).
135. Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 485-92 (1992) (identifying several factors that supervising
district courts should consider when relinquishing control over implementation of desegregation plan to
school districts); Board of Educ. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 250 (1991) (recognizing that once school
district complies with desegregation decree, federal courts no longer retain regulatory control over
school policies and rules).
136. Dowell, 498 U.S. at 248-49.
137. Missouri v. Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. 2038 (1995).
138. United States v. Yonkers Bd. of Educ., 837 F.2d 1181 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S.
1055 (1988).
139. Missouri v. Jenkins, 495 U.S. 33 (1990).
140. BARBARA H. CRAIG & DAVID M. O'BRIEN, ABORTION AND AMERICAN POLffiCS 15 (1993).
141. Joan Biskupic, Ginsburg Stresses Value of Incremental Change, WASH. PosT, July 21, 1993,
atA6.
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roadblock to innovative public policy, 142 courts often play an indispensable role
in prompting elected government action. For example, without Brown or Roe,
equal educational opportunity and abortion rights might well have meant very
different things today. But, it is equally indisputable that workable approaches to
school desegregation and abortion rights required elected government participation, sometimes supporting and at other times opposing Court action. 143 Thus,
although there may be "a magnetic attraction to the notion of an ultimate
constitutional interpreter," 144 complex social policy issues are better resolved
through "the sweaty intimacy of creatures locked in combat." 145
CONCLUSION

Constitutional decisionmaking is.a never-ending process involving all branches
and all levels of government. Remnants, by not considering how nonjudicial
actors participate in shaping constitutional values, implicitly embraces a faulty
vision of constitutional decisionmaking. As a result, the book's supposedly
neutral process-based reform proposals appear grounded in a normative vision
of judicial supremacy. 146 Making matters worse, Seidman and Tushnet's proof
of the ways that political preferences drive constitutional interpretation begs the
question of why courts should shape public policy through values-based constitutional interpretation.
Ironically, had Seidman and Tushnet considered nonjudicial influences, they
would have had a much easier time defending activist judicial review. Let me
explain. Courts, as school desegregation and abortion make clear, sometimes
trigger a national dialogue about both the power of government and the rights of
individuals. Moreover, as underscored by the Supreme Court's willingness to
disrupt prevailing elected government norms in Brown and Roe, judges and
142. Bob Nagel, for example, contends that "[t]he judiciary's frequent intervention in ordinary
political affairs works against both the preservation and healthy growth of our constitutional traditions."
ROBERT f. NAGEL, CONSTITUTIONAL CULTURES: THE MENTALITY AND CONSEQUENCES OF JUDICIAL
REVIEW 3 (1989); see also Jeremy Rabkin, Racial Progress and Constitutional Roadblocks, 34 WM. &
MARY L. REv. 75 (1992).
143. The evolution of school desegregation and abortion decisionmaking is a testament to the
profound role political actors play in shaping constitutional doctrine. Accordingly, the distinction
between theory and practice or implementation does not explain Seidman and Tushnet's failure to
consider political influences.
144. Walter F. Murphy, Who Shall Interpret: The Quest for the Ultimate Constitutional Interpreter,
48 REV. POL. 401,417 (1981).
145. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 261 (2d ed. 1986); see also JOHN
AGRESTO, THE SUPREME COURT AND CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 167 (1984) ("The genius of the
system lies in the very tension itself, and in our ability to combine an active democracy, constitutional
principles, and judicial judgment."). Whether or not "the day-to-day job of upholding the Constitution
. .. rests ... on the shoulders of every citizen," Earl Warren, The Bill of Rights and the Military, 37
N.Y.U. L. REv. 181, 202 (1962), "[w]e reject Supremacy in all three branches because of the value
placed upon freedom , discourse, democracy, and limited government." FISHER, supra note 108, at 279.
146. This assertion is also supported by Seidman and Tushnet's embrace of activist judicial review
as well as their sympathetic portrayal of the pre-New Deal period as an era when "genteel discussion
within an elite" was possible. SEIDMAN & TusHNET, supra note 1, at 165.

HeinOnline -- 85 Geo. L.J. 713 1996-1997

714

THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 85:691

politicians sometimes react differently to social and political forces. Accordingly, because special interest group pressures affect courts and elected officials
in different ways, a full-ranging consideration of the costs and benefits of
different policy outcomes is best accomplished by a government-wide decisionmaking process. For this reason, courts and elected officials should both be
activist in shaping government policy.
Seidman and Tushnet's disdain for the language of politics, however, makes
it impossible for them to see the virtues of the current system. As a result,
although their complaints about the politicization of constitutional discourse are
well-founded, contemporary constitutional discourse may not be the horror
show they describe. Seidman and Tushnet thus go too far in condemning "the
New Deal revolution" for destroying "the possibility of genteel discussion
within an elite." 147 True, at the tum of the century, constitutional debate was
less fierce, less partisan, and more or less in the control of legal elites.
Constitutional interpretation, however, also affected fewer lives. In other words,
by embracing politically charged, activist, progressive judicial review, Seidman
and Tushnet should be more accepting of the possibility that joint political and
legal dialogue sometimes produces good results. Put another way: Seidman and
Tushnet should follow their own advice and explicitly take into account the
perspectives and counterarguments of individuals, such as myself, who see
virtues in the current system.

147. /d.
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